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Abstract 
Electoral vulnerability matters for policymakers’ responsiveness to the public. While coalition 
governments are the norm in Europe, research on government responsiveness to public opinion 
studied the effects of electoral pressures mostly for single-party governments and employed 
measures of government popularity. This paper draws on and extends this research by 
developing two alternative measures of electoral vulnerability – Government Potential 
Vulnerability and Formateur Potential Vulnerability – that account for popularity limitations. An 
illustration of the measures is given by Germany (1987-2005) as a case of agenda responsiveness 
in coalition governments. Data from the Comparative Agendas Project on executive speeches in 
Germany are combined with data on vote intentions and the most important problem. Empirical 
analyses find support for the expectation that electoral vulnerability mediates agenda 
responsiveness to public issue priorities and that the proposed measures reflect more accurately 
the sources of vulnerability than government popularity. 
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Although research recognized the role of electoral pressures for government responsiveness, 
studies have mostly focused on cases of single-party governments (e.g., Canes-Wrone and Shotts 
2004; Hakhverdian 2010; but see Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008). To capture electoral pressures 
previous work has relied on measures of government popularity based on opinion polls data and 
found that electoral incentives matter for governments to respond. In turn, the wide research on 
party responsiveness to voters (for a review see Adams 2012) recognizes the importance of the 
electoral context (e.g., Spoon and Klüver 2014), but has only recently shifted attention on how 
participation in coalition governments affects party responsiveness (Klüver and Spoon 2016).1 
Our paper contributes to these research lines in two ways. On the one hand, we explore 
the conditional effect of electoral pressures on agenda responsiveness by developing two 
alternative measures. Giving an illustration of these measures is the primary goal of this paper. 
On the other hand, we extend the limited research on dynamic representation in coalition 
governments by analyzing agenda responsiveness in Germany, a case so far understudied. We 
believe this is important for at least three reasons. 
First, incumbent vulnerability is at the core of the connection between dynamic 
representation and political competition. Second, coalition governments are the norm in Europe. 
Third, measures of government popularity permit studying electoral pressures dynamically, but 
leave aside important issues. Focusing on how well or badly the government is doing at the polls, 
government popularity does not explicitly account for the fact that governing parties can be 
electorally vulnerable to opposition parties. Further, government popularity considers 
governments as monolithic entities and fails to account for the possibility that, in coalition 
                                                
1 However, see work on blame attribution by voters to parties in coalition government (e.g., 
Anderson 1995). 
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governments, vulnerability can come from the inside – junior coalition partners – and not only 
from the outside – main opposition parties. 
Although government popularity has important limitations, we think that using vote 
intentions makes sense not only because polls are a reliable predictor of the electoral outcome, 
especially when elections are close (Jennings and Wlezien 2016), but also because 
responsiveness occurs between elections (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999; Soroka and 
Wlezien 2010; Narud and Esaiasson 2013). And so we build on the government popularity 
approach and propose two alternative measures. 
One measure is based on the assumption that governments do not only care about their 
own popularity, but also about how well the opposition is doing at the polls. The other measure 
builds on the literature on formateur selection and is based on the idea of the PM party as the 
government formateur and focuses on the concept of pivotality of the PM party, which becomes 
vulnerable when it loses this pivotal advantage. 
These measures are validated against a traditional measure of popularity and applied to 
dynamic representation in Germany (1987-2005), by using data on executive speeches collected 
by the Comparative Agendas Project. We find evidence of short-term effects of electoral 
vulnerability on agenda responsiveness, in that changes in government agendas respond to 
changes in public issue priorities conditional on changes in government’s and PM party’s 
vulnerability. Our results support previous studies on government responsiveness which find that 
electoral pressure affects responsiveness. However, our measures reflect more accurately the 
country’s specific situation than measures of government popularity. We discuss the implications 
of our measures and results in the conclusions. 
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Electoral Vulnerability and Responsiveness: Going Beyond Popularity 
Policymakers’ responsiveness to public opinion is a key feature of representative democracy 
(Dahl 1971). The opinion-policy link has been widely explored through dyadic representation to 
collective representation and dynamic representation. Extensive work on dynamic representation 
has recognized the importance of both public preferences and public priorities. This duplicity has 
generated two parallel lines of research. The first perspective looks at responsiveness in terms of 
position (e.g., Soroka and Wlezien 2010; Lax and Phillips 2012), while the second perspective, 
the one adopted in this paper, looks at responsiveness in terms of attention  (e.g., Mortensen et al 
2011; Bevan and Jennings 2014). From previous research we know that different policy issues 
promote different levels of responsiveness and that the latter also depends on issue salience. 
Policymakers are in fact more likely to respond on issues that are salient and important to the 
public, whereas, given the complexity and the amount of public demands, policymakers’ 
attention is scarce and varies by agenda (e.g., Jones and Baumgartner 2005). 
Competitive democratic theory posits that the key mechanism that brings about 
responsiveness, i.e. “the need to respond”, is based on elections and its key assumption is that 
representatives aim to be re-elected. Politicians are obliged to take account of voters’ preferences 
and priorities in order to pursue their goal of vote maximization (Downs 1957; Barry 1970). 
Only if politicians are worried about the reactions of voters they will be “constantly piloted by 
the anticipation of those reactions” (Sartori 1977: 350). So, responsiveness is achieved by 
introducing Friedrich’s (1963) “mechanism of anticipated reactions”. If this mechanism relies on 
the desire of being re-elected, the incumbent will need to anticipate sympathetically voters’ 
preferences and demands. This mechanism will perform better if incumbents perceive 
themselves to be vulnerable (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1977; Strøm 1989; Bartolini 1999). 
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The conditional effect of government electoral vulnerability on government 
responsiveness finds recognition in both theoretical (e.g., Sartori 1987; Strøm 1992; Bartolini 
1999, 2000) and empirical studies (e.g., Manza and Cook 2002; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; 
Hakhverdian 2010; Pickup and Hobolt 2015). Whereas the former argue that electoral 
vulnerability has a beneficial effect on responsiveness, the latter suggest that the vulnerability 
hypothesis is reflected in different institutional arrangements and argue that electoral pressure or 
uncertainty is a powerful incentive increasing government responsiveness to citizens’ 
preferences and priorities. Note, however, that empirical evidence is far from being unanimous. 
For instance, other studies from the United States report no particular impact of presidential 
popularity on responsiveness to public concern (Cohen 1995) and that “unpopular presidents are 
not more likely than popular ones to support positions endorsed by majority opinion” (Canes-
Wrone 2004: 487). 
Scholars of responsiveness and dynamic representation assign a great deal of attention to 
the electoral pressures that governments face between elections. Studies analyzed pressures by 
selecting two main electoral incentives: how governments are doing in the polls (e.g., Canes-
Wrone and Shotts 2004; Hobolt and Klemmensen 2008; Hakhverdian 2010; Pickup and Hobolt 
2015) and how close or proximate elections are (e.g., Stimson, Mackuen, and Erikson 1995; 
Canes-Wrone and Shotts 2004). Government popularity is thus used as a proxy for capturing 
how potentially vulnerable governments are during the electoral cycle.2 
                                                
2 An alternative approach exists and analyses voters’ propensity to vote (e.g., van der Eijk and 
Oppenhuis 1991). However, this approach would not help us much since such data come from 
pre-election surveys and hence are not available at least on a yearly basis. Similar issues also 
pertain to other recent measures of electoral competitiveness and government institutional 
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While mostly focusing on cases of single-party governments, previous work does not 
effectively address the issue of vulnerability in coalition governments. Studies measuring 
government popularity use vote intentions and presidential approval as such. This approach is a 
good starting point but we think it is problematic, for it leaves some relevant issues unsolved. 
Under the popularity perspective, what counts is the government’s own popularity, no matter 
how the other parties are performing in the polls. We suspect that the argument in its support 
relies on the fact that governing parties do not care how their competitors are placed in the 
opinion polls; rather they only care about themselves and whether their own popularity goes up 
or down, and react accordingly. Yet, firstly, if government popularity declines, it does not 
necessarily mean that opposition popularity is going up, since voters might also prefer to abstain 
rather than reward opposition parties. Secondly, even if vote intentions for the government 
decline, the government might still be safe: vulnerability occurs when the potential success of 
main competitors is also included in the picture. In addition and more importantly, government 
popularity fails to consider different variations of vulnerability that come from governing type. 
That is, in coalition governments, the source of vulnerability can be internal rather than external.  
We propose two measures, which both depend on the concept of uncertainty about future 
election outcomes (Elkins 1974) and both use vote intentions. We call the first measure 
Government Potential Vulnerability (GPV), for it is based on the assumption that governments 
can feel uncertainty in respect to the possibility of losing the government at the next election. 
The second measure, Formateur Potential Vulnerability (FPV), focuses on the idea that 
vulnerability ensues when the PM party stops holding the competitive advantage of being the 
                                                                                                                                                       
vulnerability (Kayser and Lindstädt 2015; Abou-Chadi and Orlowski 2016; Immergut and Abou-
Chadi 2014; André, Depauw, and Martin 2014). 
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government formateur. If the PM party is performing badly in the polls and its vote intentions 
decrease, it might nevertheless not be feeling vulnerable until it loses the potential of forming the 
government in favor of another party. These measures are described in the subsequent sections 
and further tested as a mediating factor in a model of dynamic representation in Germany. 
 
Government Potential Vulnerability 
The measure of GPV emphasizes voters’ willingness to shift their vote. There is then no need to 
weight the measure by the strength or size of government and opposition since it is already 
embedded in the vote intention. GPV is computed by subtracting the vote intentions for the 
relevant opposition parties from the vote intentions for the governing parties: 
 
GPV (it)  =  ∑ Vote Intentions GOVT (it)  −  ∑ Vote Intentions OPP (it)  (1) 
 
where i is the party and t is time. Note that values below zero in the measure denote that the 
government is vulnerable and the more negative the values, the higher the vulnerability. The 
main question becomes which parties to include. For the government the job is easy, as all 
parties in government should be considered. What is harder is defining what the relevant 
opposition is. By relevant opposition it means those parties receiving vote intentions the 
government might be vulnerable from, including those who are not direct rivals in the 
competition for government but also those ones that can steal votes from governing parties. 
Since our second measure of FPV is quite restrictive, we aim to be as inclusive as possible with 
our measure of GPV as a kind of baseline measure. Hence, we consider relevant parties that are 
represented in parliament throughout the period of reference. This is not a perfect criterion but is 
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a simple decision to avoid ad hoc criteria of party selection.3 After all, governing parties compete 
for all votes, even if marginally. In Germany, this leaves us with CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, Greens, 
and PDS/Die Linke (see Table 1). However, as some readers might consider this criterion too 
unrestrictive for some political systems where very small parties gain parliamentary 
representation, we replicated our models by using two alternative selection criteria. One criterion 
is a quantitative adaptation of Sartori’s (1976) notable criteria of coalition potential and 
blackmail potential. According to this criterion, the party must either have been in government 
throughout the period of reference or won at least 5 percent of the votes and 5 seats in at least 
two elections (see Lühiste et al. 2017). Taking parties’ ability to gain media attention into 
account, such a decision has been already applied in other studies of representation (Bischof 
2018) and gives us exactly the same parties selected based on the parliamentary representation 
criterion. The other alternative criterion builds on the coalition formation research, especially 
with the ideas of size and incumbency status (e.g., Warwick 1996; Martin and Stevenson 2001, 
2010). Based on this criterion, we include the largest opposition party in terms of vote shares and 
those parties that during the period of reference were at some point in office. Applied to 
Germany, this more restrictive criterion leaves us with the same parties with the exception of 
PDS/Die Linke. We report the analyses on agenda responsiveness based on these two alternative 
criteria in Table A7 and our substantive results remain the same. 
 
                                                
3 This decision also aims to partly accommodate cases in first-past-the-post systems like UKIP in 
2015 that was seen as a major threat that helped create the opposition and perhaps an over-
response to it led to the Brexit vote with an unexpected Conservative majority. We thank the 
anonymous reviewer for drawing this case to our attention.   
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Formateur Potential Vulnerability 
Unlike GPV, the measure of FPV is based on the different assumption that votes are not the only 
goal governing parties aim for. This is relevant given that most of European democracies have 
coalition governments. Hence, this measure accounts for the fact that government vulnerability 
can also depend on motivations other than re-election. Indeed, although incumbent governments 
have, for various reasons, a high chance of returning immediately to office, not all incumbents 
‘should desire to re-form’ (Martin and Stevenson 2010: 503). 
Borrowing from the coalition formation research, the proposed argument is that a 
government would be considered safe to the extent that the PM party is still the formateur party.4 
At the core of FPV there is the idea of “pivotality”. We focus on the PM party because, unlike 
junior coalition partners, it is the most visible party in the coalition, the most likely to set the 
agenda and influence government policy, and the party that typically has the opportunity to call 
early elections. Being the most visible party in the coalition, voters are more likely to make 
judgments regarding the PM party than its junior coalition partners, as research on coalition 
                                                
4 Note that the formateur is not necessarily the PM party and there is no clear evidence that the 
largest, the strongest or the most ideologically central party is designated to be the party which 
will form the government (Warwick 1996; but see Bäck and Dumont 2008). Other factors such 
as familiarity and governing experience are also relevant (Warwick 1996; Martin and Stevenson 
2001; Bäck and Dumont 2007). Nonetheless, the problem of finding the formateur is relevant for 
explaining coalition formation, but it is not an issue for our purpose because the measure is 
computed on the already revealed PM party. 
 
 
 9 
heuristics shows (e.g., Fortunato and Stevenson 2013), and so the safety of the PM party has 
important implications for the stability of the whole government, even though the PM party can 
decide to form a coalition with another party if the polls look favorably (see, e.g., Lupia and 
Strøm 1995). 
Although research on formateur selection proposes alternative criteria, we prioritize the 
“largest party status” in our measure. That is, the government becomes vulnerable at the time 
that the PM party is no longer the largest party in the opinion polls.5 Together, we propose two 
variations of FPV, useful to detect the source of vulnerability: (a) the largest junior coalition 
partner or (b) the largest opposition party. Scenario (b) is crucial to apply the measure to single-
party (minority) governments, given that in such cases scenario (a) would not be empirically 
feasible. The measure of FPV will then be operationalized in the following ways: 
 
FPVit (a)  =  Vote Intentions PM (it)  −  Vote Intentions LJUNIOR (it) (2) 
                                                
5 The formateur selection literature posits another potential source of vulnerability that comes 
from the notion of median party status. However, incorporating this criterion is problematic for 
at least four reasons. First, the median party might not be the formateur, i.e. the PM party. 
Second, it is unclear whether a loss of popularity is independent of the loss of the median party 
status, potentially causing endogeneity problems. Third, there is a measurement issue involved, 
as the median party can be measured through manifestos, experts or voters, and measures of 
voters’ perceptions of parties’ positions are more likely to be available in election surveys than 
within the election cycle. Fourth, the median party is based on the assumption that Left-Right is 
the only relevant dimension, which is usually not the case. For all these reasons, we avoid 
including the median party status as an explicit criterion for FPV.  
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FPVit (b)  =  Vote Intentions PM (it)  − Vote Intentions LOPP (it)  (3) 
 
FPVit (c)  =  Vote Intentions PM (it)  −  Vote Intentions LCOMP (it) (4) 
 
where PM is the PM party, LJUNIOR is the largest coalition partner (defined as the coalition 
partner with the highest vote intentions), LOPP is the largest opposition party (defined as the 
opposition party with the highest vote intentions), and LCOMP is the largest competitor in 
absolute terms (defined as the party with the highest vote intentions besides the PM party). Note, 
again, that values below zero in the measure denote that the PM party is vulnerable and the more 
negative the values, the higher the vulnerability. 
 
An Illustration: Agenda Responsiveness in Germany (1987-2005) 
We apply these vulnerability measures to Germany, which is a very versatile example for 
empirically testing the impact of government vulnerability on dynamic representation. Since one 
of our measures takes into consideration vulnerability of the PM party from its largest coalition 
partner, a case of coalition government illustrates all variants of vulnerability better than a case 
of single-party government such as the US. 
Allowing the formation of pre-electoral coalitions which produce a bipolar pattern 
conducive to high levels of cabinet durability (Saalfeld 2005), the German case offers a high 
variability in terms of types of government, experiencing both multi-party coalition governments 
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and grand coalitions.6 Table 1 and Figure 1 report how the measures of GPV and FPV are 
constructed and their level for the period of reference.  
 
Table 1. Measures of electoral vulnerability in Germany, 1987-2005 
 
 GPV  FPV 
(a) 
 FPV 
(b) 
 FPV 
(c) 
 
 GOVT OPP PM 
PARTY 
LARGEST 
JUNIOR 
PM 
PARTY 
LARGEST 
OPP 
PM 
PARTY 
LARGEST 
COMP 
1987 CDU/CSU 
+ FDP 
SPD + 
Greens 
CDU/CSU FDP CDU/CSU SPD CDU/CSU SPD 
1991 CDU/CSU 
+ FDP 
SPD + 
Greens + 
PDS/Linke 
CDU/CSU FDP CDU/CSU SPD CDU/CSU SPD 
1994 CDU/CSU 
+ FDP 
SPD + 
Greens + 
PDS/Linke 
CDU/CSU FDP CDU/CSU SPD CDU/CSU SPD 
1998 SPD + 
Greens 
CDU/CSU 
+ FDP + 
PDS/Linke 
SPD Greens SPD CDU/CSU SPD CDU/CSU 
2002 SPD + 
Greens 
CDU/CSU 
+ FDP + 
PDS/Linke 
SPD Greens SPD CDU/CSU SPD CDU/CSU 
2005 CDU/CSU 
+ SPD 
FDP + 
Greens + 
PDS/Linke 
CDU/CSU SPD CDU/CSU Greens CDU/CSU SPD 
 
                                                
6 CAP provides data for other countries with coalition governments, such as Italy, Denmark and 
the Netherlands. However, no consistent time-series on public issue priorities for the Danish and 
Dutch cases exists, while in Italy only investiture speeches are coded and public issue priorities 
are available from Eurobarometer only since 2003, leaving us with very few data points on each 
policy domain. Unfortunately, these issues prevent us from replicating our analyses with 
additional cases. 
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Notes. The year refers to the time when a government took office. 
 
 
Figure 1. Measures of government and formateur potential vulnerability in 
Germany, 1987-2005 
 
 
 
The left-upper panel shows the level of government vulnerability according to the GPV 
measure. Most of governments are below the zero line (which means maximal uncertainty) but 
not the SPD-Green coalition government between 1998 and 2002. The 2005 grand coalition 
makes the CDU-SPD government safe again given the high vote intentions assigned in the polls. 
The right-upper side shows, instead, the level of vulnerability of the PM party against its junior 
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coalition partner. The formateur is never really vulnerable, meaning that the PM party in 
Germany is never afraid of losing its pivotal advantage in favor of another coalition member. 
Differently, the lower panels show the vulnerability of the PM party against the largest 
opposition party (left-hand side) and against the largest absolute competitor (right-hand side). In 
Germany, the pattern of these two variants of FPV is similar to the pattern of GPV, except that in 
2005 the largest competitor of the CDU is its junior coalition partner SPD. 
Germany is also an ideal case for dynamic representation because of data availability 
issues. To measure dynamic representation data on public issue priorities and government 
agendas are used. To measure government agendas, data from the Comparative Agendas Project 
(CAP) on executive speeches (Regierungserklärungen) are available from 1987 to 2005 (Breunig 
and Schnatterer N.d.). To measure public priorities the most important problem (MIP) question is 
used. Time-series data on vote intentions and for the MIP question are available from the 
Politbarometer. The simultaneous availability of data on voting intentions, the most important 
problem and government agendas makes Germany an invaluable case to test the effects of 
government vulnerability on dynamic representation. 
Executive speeches are delivered annually by the head of state or the head of 
government, and are formal statements that set out the government’s agenda for the year ahead 
(Jennings, Bevan, and John 2011). These speeches are available yearly and communicate the 
government’s general priorities as well as more specific measures that it plans to address. Hence, 
they are costly signals that ‘create future potential costs for the government, if the priorities in 
the speech are not followed by policy outputs’ (Bevan, John, and Jennings 2011). Previous 
studies, in fact, document the translation of governments’ policy agendas into legislative outputs 
in the United States (Edwards and Wood 1999) and Britain (Bara 2005; Bevan, John, and 
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Jennings 2011) and, moreover, comparative research documents that executive speeches reflect 
the issues governing parties emphasize in other venues, suggesting that these speeches are 
reasonable proxies for the government’s more general rhetorical emphases (Green-Pedersen, 
Mortensen, and So 2015). Similar to the Comparative Manifestos Project’s codings of party 
manifestos (Budge et al. 2001), the CAP coding scheme takes the quasi-sentences in executive 
speeches as the unit of analysis, with each quasi-sentence assigned a single topic code. 
For our analysis, we can rely on the following CAP Major Topics: Macroeconomics (1), 
Health (3), Education (6), Environment (7), Law and Crime (12), Social Welfare (13), Housing 
(14), Defense (16), and International A fairs and Foreign Trade (19) (see Table A8 for summary 
statistics).7 
 
The Model 
A regression model is specified to evaluate the effect of government potential 
vulnerability on responsiveness. Scholars’ attention has recently moved to applications of error 
correction models (ECMs) to time-series data. Using ECMs became common practice 
particularly in studies of dynamic representation (e.g., Jennings and John 2009; Bevan and 
Jennings 2014), for they allow one to estimate both short-term and long-term effects (De Boef 
and Keele 2008) of changes in public opinion on government activity. The choice in favor of an 
ECM is also methodologically appropriate, given that unit root tests reveal that not all executive 
speeches series are stationary and the null hypothesis that all the panels contain a unit root cannot 
                                                
7 The data will in due course be made publicly available at 
http://www.comparativeagendas.net/datasets_codebooks.  
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be rejected.8 Since first-difference models often perform poorly and throw out long-run effects, 
the adoption of an ECM is a valuable solution (e.g., Beck and Katz 2011). 
Another reason why ECMs are appropriate for these data is the presence of time 
dependencies in the data. In fact, visual inspection of autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation 
functions suggest first-order autocorrelation in the dependent variable. The pooled models are 
estimated with panel corrected standard errors (PCSE) (Beck and Katz 1995), which controls for 
panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlations of the errors. 
The model specifies over-time changes in emphasis in executive speeches as a function 
of the levels of (and changes in) public issue priorities. The dependent variable, [∆ Govt Speech 
(t)], is the difference between issue emphasis in the executive speech in the current year and 
issue emphasis in the executive speech in the previous year, i.e., positive values on the dependent 
variable denote that the government’s issue emphasis on the issue has increased over the past 
year. The independent variables are: [Govt Speech (t−1)], government’s issue emphasis in the 
executive speech in the preceding year; [Public Priorities (t−1)], the proportion of the previous 
year’s public issue emphasis; [∆ Public Priorities (t)], the change in public issue emphasis in the 
current year compared to public issue emphasis in the previous year; [Vulnerability (t−1)], the 
level of government potential vulnerability (measured as GPV or FPV) in the previous year; and 
[∆ Vulnerability (t)], the change in current government potential vulnerability (measured as GPV 
or FPV) compared to its vulnerability in the previous year. The following pooled model is 
estimated yearly over all the governments in the study: 
 
∆ Govt Speech (t)  =  α0  +  α1 [Govt Speech (t−1)]   
                                                
8 Fisher-type tests based on ADF tests are used to detect non-stationarity in the data. 
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+  β1 [∆ Public Priorities (t)]  +  β2 [Public Priorities (t−1)] 
+  β3 [∆ Vulnerability (t)]  +  β4 [Vulnerability (t−1)] 
+  β5 [∆PublicPriorities (t)  ×  ∆ Vulnerability (t)] 
+  β6 [Public Priorities (t−1)  ×  Vulnerability (t−1)] 
+  β7 [Govt Ideology (t)]        (5) 
 
To evaluate the Vulnerability Hypothesis, the key coefficients are those on the interaction 
between [∆ Public Priorities (t)] and [∆ Vulnerability (t)] variables, for short-term effects, and 
the interaction between the [Public Priorities (t−1)] and [Vulnerability (t−1)] variables, for long-
term effects. A negative coefficient β5 on the short-term interaction between public priorities and 
government vulnerability would denote that an increase in public priorities on a given issue in 
the current year – compared to the previous year – is associated with an increase in issue 
emphasis in government speeches conditional on government vulnerability, i.e., that the 
government responds to short-term changes in public priorities when vulnerable. Similarly, a 
negative coefficient β6 on the long-term interaction between public priorities and government 
vulnerability would denote that an increase in public priorities on a given issue in the previous 
year is associated with an increase in issue emphasis in government speeches conditional on 
government vulnerability, i.e., that the government responds to public priorities in the previous 
year when vulnerable. 
To assess dynamic representation independently of the conditional effect of vulnerability, 
the coefficients of interest are β1and β2. A positive and significant coefficient β1 on the [∆ 
Public Priorities (t)] variable would denote that increases in public priorities in the current year 
(compared to the previous year) are associated with increased government emphasis in its 
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speech, a short-term effect, while a positive and significant coefficient β2 on the [Public 
Priorities (t−1)] variable would denote that the more an issue becomes important to the public at 
the previous time period, the more the government emphasizes it in its speech at the current 
period. 
A negative and significant coefficient β3 [∆ Vulnerability (t)] variable would denote that 
an increase in government vulnerability in the current year (compared to the previous year) is 
associated with increased government emphasis in its speech, a short-term effect, while a 
negative and significant coefficient β4 on the [Vulnerability (t−1)] variable would denote that the 
more the government is vulnerable at the previous time period, the more the government 
emphasizes a given issue in its speech at the current period. 
The model specification also includes the government’s lagged issue emphasis in its 
speech, [Govt Speech (t−1)], to control for the government’s long-term level of issue emphasis in 
its speech, and to evaluate whether governments that were emphasizing a given issue at the 
previous time period tend to emphasize it less at the current time period. The model also controls 
for government ideology. Including the variable [Govt Ideology (t)] in the equation allows testing 
the mechanism through which public opinion influences policy (see Hakhverdian 2010: 849-
850).9 
Finally, in the empirical analyses years when a new government emerged whose ideology 
differed from the previous government, such as Schroeder I in 1998 and Merkel I in 2005, are 
omitted. This is because in these years the lagged and current levels of government rhetoric 
pertain to different governments, so that the public plausibly does not hold the current 
                                                
9 Government ideology is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the PM party is the SPD and 0 if the 
PM party is the CDU. 
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government responsible for the previous government’s lagged behavior. However, successive 
governments with the same Chancellor are considered as the same. 
 
Results 
Table 2 reports the parameter estimates (with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses) for 
the pooled model given by equation 5 above, estimated over all issues. Column 2 reports the 
parameter estimates computed using a common measure of Government Popularity, column 3 
reports the parameter estimates computed using the Government Potential Vulnerability 
measure, whereas columns 4-6 reports the parameter estimates computed using the Formateur 
Potential Vulnerability measures.10 Before turning to effects pertaining to public priorities and 
government vulnerability, note that the coefficient on the variable [Govt Speech (t−1)] is 
negative and significant in all four sets of analyses while the coefficient on the intercept is 
positive, which implies a ‘regression to the mean’ in government issue emphasis, i.e., when 
government issue emphasis was unusually high (low) at the previous time period, then emphasis 
tended to subsequently decline (increase) at the current period. 
We next consider the effects of public priorities and government vulnerability. If 
dynamic representation in Germany occurs, we would expect significant coefficient estimates on 
either (or both) of the variables [∆ Public Priorities (t)] and [Public Priorities (t−1)]. This is 
indeed the case.11 If government vulnerability was equal to zero, the coefficient estimates on 
                                                
10 Note that since some of the measures are highly correlated with each other (see Table A1), we 
preferred to estimate our model by including one variable at a time. 
11 The models without interactions are reported in Table A2 and confirm that dynamic 
representation in Germany occurs independently of electoral vulnerability. In fact, long-term 
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these variables, in combination with their standard errors, would imply that public issue salience 
has both short-term and long-term positive and significant effects on government emphasis in its 
executive speeches, i.e. that the government responds in its policy agendas to both changes in 
and past levels of public priorities. The analysis also shows that there is no direct effect of 
electoral vulnerability – either in the short-term or in the long-term – on changes in government 
emphasis in executive speeches, in that that coefficients of the variables [∆ Vulnerability (t)] and 
[Vulnerability (t−1)] are insignificant at conventional levels, except in one case. 
 
Table 2. The vulnerability hypothesis in Germany (1987-2005) 
 
 POP GPV FPV 
(a) 
FPV 
(b) 
FPV 
(c) 
Govt Speech (t-1) -1.015*** 
(0.161) 
-1.018*** 
(0.161) 
-1.016*** 
(0.159) 
-1.006*** 
(0.158) 
-1.006*** 
(0.158) 
∆ Public Priorities (t) 0.184* 
(0.104) 
0.184* 
(0.103) 
0.175* 
(0.104) 
0.192* 
(0.103) 
0.192* 
(0.103) 
Public Priorities (t-1) 0.386 
(0.306) 
0.198*** 
(0.053) 
0.185 
(0.166) 
0.194*** 
(0.051) 
0.194*** 
(0.051) 
∆ Vulnerability (t) 0.013 
(0.048) 
0.010 
(0.025) 
0.031 
(0.040) 
0.006 
(0.023) 
0.006 
(0.023) 
Vulnerability (t-1) -0.119 
(0.077) 
-0.067 
(0.042) 
-0.109** 
(0.055) 
-0.062 
(0.040) 
-0.062 
(0.039) 
∆ Public Priorities (t)  ×  ∆ Vulnerability (t) -0.029* 
(0.015) 
-0.018** 
(0.009) 
-0.032* 
(0.017) 
-0.021** 
(0.010) 
-0.021** 
(0.010) 
Public Priorities (t-1)  ×  Vulnerability (t-1) -0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
Govt Ideology (t) 0.915* 
(0.507) 
0.848* 
(0.481) 
0.147 
(0.491) 
0.331 
(0.437) 
0.331 
(0.437) 
Constant 7.215** 
(3.452) 
1.499*** 
(0.572) 
5.627*** 
(1.788) 
1.826*** 
(0.498) 
1.826*** 
(0.498) 
N 128 128 128 128 128 
R2 0.58 0.58 0.56 0.58 0.58 
                                                                                                                                                       
effects of public priorities on government speeches are positive and significant at conventional 
levels. 
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* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Notes. The coefficients are reported with panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. Column 
2 compares the government popularity (POP) model with the government vulnerability models 
(GPV, FPV a, b, c). The variables are defined in the text. 
 
The results on the Vulnerability Hypothesis are now considered. If electoral vulnerability 
had a beneficial effect on government responsiveness, a negative and significant coefficient on 
either (or both) of the interacted variables [∆ Public Priorities (t)  ×  ∆ Vulnerability (t)] and 
[Public Priorities (t−1)  ×  Vulnerability (t − 1)] would be expected. According to the level of 
vulnerability based on the different measures proposed, it has been argued above that a stronger 
effect of both government vulnerability and the PM party vulnerability on government 
responsiveness would be expected in all but one scenario, namely in the case of vulnerability of 
the PM party against its junior coalition partner, which in Germany seems to be none. While the 
empirical analysis finds no long-term effects of potential vulnerability on government 
responsiveness in any of the vulnerability measures, the Vulnerability Hypothesis is, instead, 
supported in the short-run. There is, indeed, evidence of short-term effects of electoral 
vulnerability on government responsiveness in all models, but differences apply. 
The conditional effect of the interacted variable [∆ Public Priorities (t)  ×  ∆ 
Vulnerability (t)] is negative and weakly significant (p < 0.10) for the vulnerability of the PM 
party against its largest junior coalition partner (model FPV (a)), which is in line with our 
expectations. The effect is instead stronger (p < 0.05) for the vulnerability of the government as 
a whole against opposition (model GPV), the vulnerability of the PM party against its largest 
opposition party (model FPV (b)) as well as against its strongest competitor (model FPV (c)). 
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Column 2 reports the results for the Government Popularity (POP) measure, where 
neither junior coalition partners nor opposition parties are explicitly taken into account. In 
comparison with our vulnerability measures, short-term effects of government popularity on 
government responsiveness to public priorities are also present. The coefficient in the interactive 
variable is in fact in the right direction, namely lower government popularity is associated with 
higher responsiveness. However, it is worth noting that the coefficient of the interaction is only 
statistically significant at p < 0.10. 
Figure 2 displays the marginal effects of the [∆ Public Priorities (t)  ×  ∆ Vulnerability 
(t)] variable on the [∆ Govt Speech (t)] variable, computed for the coefficient estimates reported 
in Table 1. According to the plot, an increase in public priorities on a given issue in the current 
year – compared to the previous year – is associated with an increase in issue emphasis in 
government speeches conditional on government vulnerability. The effect of vulnerability on 
responsiveness stops being statistically significant at around zero, suggesting that only negative 
and not positive changes in vulnerability are associated with an increase in government 
responsiveness to public priorities. 
To sum up, our findings show that there is a relationship between electoral pressures and 
government responsiveness to public priorities in the German Chancellor’s policy agenda. The 
way these electoral pressures are measured leads to somewhat different results. In particular, 
short-term effects of electoral vulnerability on responsiveness are stronger when the whole 
government faces the major opposition and when the PM party faces the largest opposition party 
or the largest competitor, which in the period covered by our data almost always coincide. Short-
term effects are, instead, weaker with a classic measure of government popularity and when the 
PM party faces its junior coalition partner, which in Germany never really constitutes a big threat 
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to the Chancellor party. 
 
Figure 2. Effects of electoral vulnerability on agenda responsiveness in 
Germany (1987-2005), by measure 
 
 
Note. The figure displays the marginal effects of the [∆ Public Priorities (t)  ×  ∆ Vulnerability 
(t)] variable on the [∆ Govt Speech (t)] variable, computed for the coefficient estimates reported 
in Table 2. The dashed lines denote 95 percent confidence intervals. The variables are defined in 
the text. 
 
Robustness Checks (note to reviewers: these analyses are reported in a Supplementary 
Materials memo appended at the end of the paper) 
−.
5
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
−1
−1
.5
2.
5
Ef
fe
cts
 o
n 
Fi
tte
d 
Va
lue
s
−60 −40−50 −30−20−10 0 10 20 30
Change in POP
−1
0
1
2
−1
.5
−.
5
1.
5
.5
2.
5
Ef
fe
cts
 o
n 
Fi
tte
d 
Va
lue
s
−60 −40 −20 0 20−50 −30 −10 10 30
Change in GPV
−1
.5
−1
−.
5
0
.5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
Ef
fe
cts
 o
n 
Fi
tte
d 
Va
lue
s
−10 0 10 20 30−20−30−40−50−60
Change in FPV (a)
−.
5
0
.5
1
1.
5
−1
−1
.5
2
2.
5
Ef
fe
cts
 o
n 
Fi
tte
d 
Va
lue
s
−30−20−10 0 10 20 30−40−50−60
Change in FPV (b)
−.
5
0
.5
1
1.
5
−1
−1
.5
2
2.
5
Ef
fe
cts
 o
n 
Fi
tte
d 
Va
lue
s
−30−20−10 0 10 20 30−40−50−60
Change in FPV (c)
 23 
We conducted additional analyses to assess the robustness of our findings. First, the models have 
been re-estimated by including a trend variable that controls for time effects (Table A3) and by 
including policy dummies to control for policy effects (Table A4). Second, since the state of the 
economy might have an impact on government policy, we re-estimated the models while 
controlling for national levels of unemployment and inflation, along with changes in these levels 
(Table A5). These analyses, which are reported in the SM memo, continue to support our 
substantive conclusions. Third, since the causal relationship between opinion and policy can also 
be reciprocal (e.g., Soroka and Wlezien 2010) in that popular governments can lead public 
opinion (Hakhverdian 2012), the counter movement hypothesis is also tested (Table A6). No 
evidence, however, is found in Germany that governments manipulate the public by influencing 
issue priorities through their policy agendas when they are popular. 
 
Conclusion and Discussion 
Governing parties’ behavior in opinion polls is important not only for election outcomes but also 
for policy and representation. Our paper makes several contributions for the latter. First, work on 
responsiveness tended to capture dynamics in electoral pressures using a measure of government 
popularity. We discussed the limitations of this approach and went beyond by proposing two 
more fine-grained measures of vulnerability using opinion polls that can be easily replicated by 
political analysts for undertaking comparative research. This was the main goal of the paper. 
Second, our contribution is also empirical. Both measures are tested on the framework of 
dynamic representation with data from the Comparative Agendas Project on executive speeches 
in Germany (1987-2005). Our findings are the following.  
First of all, dynamic representation in Germany works, whereby past public issue 
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priorities influence changes in issue emphasis in German government agendas (Table A2), and 
this is in line with previous findings on agenda responsiveness (e.g., see Bevan and Jennings 
2014). More importantly for our purposes, we find short-term effects of electoral vulnerability on 
agenda responsiveness to public priorities. In particular, we find that German coalition 
governments are more under siege when pressure comes from outside rather than from inside the 
government. That is, the PM party in Germany is never really vulnerable against its junior 
coalition partner. Interestingly, government attention to public priorities is not much conditional 
on the level of government vulnerability, when the latter is measured in relation to the 
performance of the junior coalition partner at the polls or when traditional measures of popularity 
are used. The electoral incentive, instead, occurs when vulnerability of the PM party is measured 
as a function of the strength of the major opposition party. In this case, in fact, vulnerability does 
have a short-term effect on government responsiveness and governing parties adjust their policy 
agendas to public priorities. Hence we think our measures depict the effect of vulnerability on 
responsiveness more reliably than the effect of government popularity on responsiveness. 
We believe that our measures can find application in other research areas such as the one 
of coalition heuristics (e.g., Fortunato and Stevenson 2013) to answer some of the questions 
arising from coalition politics and its consequences on voters. For instance, recent research by 
Sagarzazu and Klüver (2017) finds that coalition parties need to compromise in order to maintain 
the coalition and, at the same time, need to differentiate from their partners to strengthen their 
own policy profile. On the same line, Klüver and Spoon (2016) find that, as conflict over an 
issue among coalition partners increases, parties will pay less attention to voters’ issue priorities. 
Would, then, the loss of the formateur advantage have consequences for the longevity and unity 
of the coalition? Would this have consequences for voters’ perceptions of coalition partners’ 
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positions?  
Our paper comes with important limitations. Although agenda responsiveness in 
Germany represents an illustrative case for our measures, our findings are not easily 
generalizable and are limited to the data at our disposal. Consistent with previous studies, our 
findings are based on issues that are considered salient in the public sphere, but cannot say much 
for low or not salient issues. However, previous research by Hobolt and Klemmensen (2008) and 
Hakhverdian (2010) using executive speeches found evidence that popularity has an impact on 
agenda responsiveness in different contexts and in the expected direction. We want to avoid 
speculations but, taken together, our findings and their findings seem suggesting that there is 
some scope for electoral incentives influencing dynamic representation in symbolic/rhetorical 
policy venues. 
Future research should study whether electoral vulnerability of different coalition 
partners influences their responsiveness differently and whether the vulnerability effect varies 
across the election cycle, such as in the campaign (Bevan and Krewel 2015). The German case 
showed that government attention responds when vulnerability comes from outside the 
government. Future research should also explain the source of vulnerability in countries with 
more fragmented party systems where more than one coalition partner is in government, and 
whether the potential of losing the pivotality advantage would be sufficient for governments to 
respond. 
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